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Abstract. 4 This paper examines the connectivity among political net-
works on Twitter. We explore dynamics inside and between the far right
and the far left, as well as the relation between the structure of the net-
work and the sentiment. The 2015 Greek political context o↵ers a unique
opportunity to investigate political communication in times of political
intensity and crisis. We explore interactions inside and between political
networks on Twitter in the run up to the elections of three di↵erent bal-
lots: the parliamentary election of 25 January, the bailout referendum of
5 July, the snap election of 20 September; we, then, compare political
action during campaigns with that during routinized politics.
1 Introduction
According to the echo chamber thesis, political networks on the internet are frag-
mented and limiting. Online political communication basically preaches to the
converted with little or no possibility to influence opinions, spread new ideas, or
ensure a plurality of views. If this is the case, exposure on the web is constrained
to reinforcement inside more or less ideologically homogeneous communities,
and to silence or polarization towards politically divergent networks. However,
constant expansion in the use of social media platforms and fluidity in voter
choices oblige us to re-examine the dynamics of political networks, particularly
in contexts of extreme uncertainty and polarization. Moreover, the popularity
of the echo chamber claim has neglected important functions and dynamics of
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2online political networks such as the relation between structure of the network
and discourse. Whereas, furthermore, we have investigated the types of political
structures formed in social media, we know little about the online communica-
tion of the ideological edges of the political system. Psycho-social theories and
political research on radicalism show that inter-group polarity and opposition are
vital for solidifying intra-group identity and trust. Political and community con-
flict can be exacerbated by the behaviour of antagonistic parties even when this
behaviour does not constitute an attempt to a↵ect the outcome of the conflict
by gaining advantage in influence or material position.
The Case of Greece. We examine a series of innovative hypotheses, by focusing
on the case of Greece during the period of the great crisis which started in 2010,
under the light of the wealth of possibilities that the new media revolution has
opened for political action and communication. Greece has been the country
firstly and most severely hit by the recent financial crisis in the EU. It received
immense international financial aid, which has been followed by acute austerity
measures[12] . As a result, big parts of the Greek society radicalized, which was
often reflected on a dense protest cycle, violent and anti-systemic. Polarization
and electoral volatility prevailed throughout a period of political instability, con-
secutive elections and negotiations with the bailout partners. The evolution of
the party competition signaled a passage from an until 2009 centripetal democ-
racy, to a centrifugal democracy formed by the earthquake elections of May 2012
to a polarized multi-party party system, which has been established ever since
[8]. The dominant parties of the two-party system which existed since the 1980s
collapsed; whereas the country experienced since then the meteoric rise of old
minor or marginal political actors (SYRIZA, HA), as well as the emergence of a
series of splinter parties, mainly radical (ANEL, LAE). We consider Greece as
a unique product of the financial crisis, in the sense that since 2012 the third
party in parliament is a neo-Nazi party, whereas the government in place since
2015, is a coalition of the far left and the far right [20]. Greece, hence, brings
topical phenomena and trends of European politics to their limits.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized in the following points:
– We study the online blueprint of radicalization in times of crises; how the
emergence of new cleavages is reflected in the online political world and what
dynamics it produces between di↵erent political spaces.
– We bring into discussion the online polarization in multi-party systems,
which covers an existing lacuna stemming from the fact that most relevant
studies focus on the US two-party system.
– We propose and utilize a novel method for advocates’ identification. An
algorithm that assigns citizens to political spaces based on their activity in
social media.
– We collect two large sets of twitter messages that we break into three time
windows relevant to our research. Our method permits to capture variation
of political networks over time, as well as change in individual stances.
– We test our hypotheses by introducing measures of political cohesion, com-
munication density and network visualizations.
32 Related Work
In this section we overview theoretical discussions relevant to our research ques-
tions and hypotheses.
Communication, Information and Influence In contemporary democratic
environments, citizens receive information mainly through interpersonal com-
munication, mass media and digital media. Despite tendency of interpersonal
communication to reinforce confirmed beliefs and relations with like-minded peo-
ple, disagreement perseveres, mainly in low-density networks, that leave room
for relatively distanced acquaintances. Mass media are more likely to expose in-
dividuals to diverse information in comparison to face-to-face discussions [16].
Nonetheless, the public is not passive when exposed to the media. Selective ex-
posure research has pointed that individuals are driven in media channels or
information, which match their beliefs [2], whilst secluding others with which
they disagree. Because of their choice-enhancing capacities and the algorithms
which define suggestions on who to follow [6], social media are said to be more
conducive to ideological self-segregation.
Political Homophily in Social Media Political discussions on social media
are said to take place inside echo chambers [4] , which correspond to political
sub-groups characterized by a broad ideological homogeneity. Among a series of
parameters, ideological stances a↵ect the levels of individual and group fragmen-
tation. The echo chamber thesis is not, however, uncontested. Holbert, Garrett
and Gleason argued that the fact that digital political communication increases
individual exposure to like-minded ideas and sources of information, this does
not mean that the same individuals avoid [10] or can totally filter out contrary
or di↵erent viewpoints. Social media facilitate contact with diverse and hetero-
geneous political opinions unintentionally, when individuals use them for non-
political reasons [24], since information circulates across networks on various,
di↵erent occasions [3]. A recent strand of research brings in discussion the im-
portance of the nexus between online and o✏ine political discussions, as well as
elements stemming from political psychology theories, like the level of openness
of an individual and the level of political interest [22].
Polarization and Political Extremism Ideology is the driving force in echo
chambers formation. In a systematic large scale comparative research of frag-
mentation on Twitter between individuals, groups and group-dyads, [5] finds
that parties networks which are distanced in ideological terms, interact less and
that echo chambers are mostly likely formed by users and groupings positioned
at the extreme ends of the ideological scale. Under certain circumstances, like in
periods of financial crises and political tensions, individuals facing relative depri-
vation or grievances of various kinds can radicalize towards political extremism.
Ideology, emotions [7], as well as trigger events and socialization environments
can play a role in embracing extremist views or actions. Extremist and terrorist
groups use the internet for a myriad of purposes, including the dissemination
of propaganda, the recruitment of members and the development of operational
planning. While right-wing extremist communities have had an online presence
for years through dedicated websites, there has been an increased activity on so-
4cial media in recent years. Nevertheless, the extent to which the Internet a↵ects
radicalization into violence is contested.
The Decline of the Left-Right Ideological Distinction and the Rise of
New Cleavages Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the collapse of the old
twopartyism and the rise of radical and extreme parties, a new, more polarized
bipolar system has restructured political conflicts and expressed emerging issues
[8]. Hence, from 2010 until the summer of 2015, in a context of unprecedented
polarization, parties of the centre-right and the centre-left have supported bailout
policies, the European currency and stay in the EU, whereas parties of the far
right and the far left shared anti-bailout stances, populism and Euroscepticism,
which for some amongst them turned to fierce hostility towards the EU and
the desire of adopting the national currency. A paradoxical political alliance has
been the coalition government which was formed in January 2015 between the
radical left party of SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) and the far right
party of ANEL (Independent Greeks) [20]. Research on polarization in social
media cannot neglect those important shifts in party competition and political
alliances. Measures of fragmentation should take into account at the same time
the old Left-Right divide and the new bailout-anti-bailout conflict, and hence
examine the frequency and nature of interactions of political networks formed
alongside those lines of divisions.
Study of Discussions in Social Media [14] study on-line discussions in or-
der to identify patterns in how German politicians acted in social media during
the 2013 elections. Their main data source is the Twitter network. [19] present
a study of Twitter during the Brazilian protests of 2013. Similar to our work,
sentiment analysis and user activity is the tool for exploring the data. The au-
thors observed that activity and sentiment peaks coincide with the days of the
protests. [23] infer the political signature of the Twitter users by applying a walk-
ing algorithm over the social graph. The output of the method is the estimated
distribution of political preference over the eight Flemish political parties. A
case study on the 2014 national elections is presented. [4] discuss the way Twit-
ter reacts on major political and non-political events. Their main conclusion is
that polarization in social media is limited in comparison with what has been
observed by previous work.
Identifying Advocates In [18] the authors build a framework for identifying
advocates for political campaigns in social media. The framework models mes-
sage strategies, propagation strategies and community structure. These three
elements comprise the features that are utilized as input in data classification
algorithms like Linear Discriminant Analysis. The authors observe that the pro-
posed frame-work outperforms a set of baseline methods (random assignment,
total number of tweets as a feature, bag-of-words) in identifying advocates. Ex-
periments include two use cases utilizing Twitter data. The first regards elections
in India while the second is about gun rights in the United States. [9] investi-
gate the possibility of automatically identifying peoples voting intentions for the
Scottish Independence Referendum by analyzing their Tweets.
5Table 1: Total number of unfiltered tweets collected from timelines of candidates
and potential advocates.
Period KKE ANTARSIA LAE SYRIZA PASOK POTAMI ND HA ANEL TOTAL
1st 0.04M 0.16M - 1.22M 0.89M 0.88M 1.55M 0.13M 0.66M 5.51M
2nd-3rd 0.05M 1.07M 0.41M 0.63M 1.20M 0.71M 1.84M 0.14M 0.56M 6.60M
Opinion Mining and Sentiment Analysis In recent years, many research
studies focus on the problem of sentiment lexicon construction. Most of them
utilize some opinion seed words and word similarities to construct the sentiment
lexicon. According to the way in which the word similarities are obtained, these
studies can be categorized into three types of approaches: a) the semantic the-
saurus based approaches [11], [13] b) the corpus based approaches [21], [15] ,
and c) the pattern based approaches [17]. In this paper we will utilize a tool
developed by our research team that falls into the third category [1].
3 Data Collection and Advocate’s Identification
3.1 Data Collection
In order to test the hypotheses under study, we collected three large sets of
twitter datasets that were relevant to our research. What is necessary for our
data collection is a pool of leaders (representatives of each space) that will aid
in identifying the political networks (i.e. the advocates of each political space).
Time Periods. In order to capture variation over time and between periods
of di↵erent political intensity, we introduced two 3-month periods of political
campaigns and di↵erent kinds of elections and one period of routinized politics.
- First Period: The important political events of the first period (01.11.2014 -
30.01.2015) are the presidential election in parliaments which led to a stalemate
and provoked an early parliamentary election; the victory of SYRIZA in the
January 2015 election and the coalition government with ANEL.
- Second Period: The second period (21.06.2015-21.09.2015) is the most po-
larized among the three, dominated by the referendum for the bailout agreement,
the enduring negotiations of the Greek government with the European partners,
intense and consecutive parliamentary procedures and the snap parliamentary
election of September 2015.
- Third Period: In the third period (01.03.2016 - 30.05.2016) the main events
where the refugee crisis and the new austerity measures. Given the fact that no
elections took place between the 2nd and the 3rd period, neither during the third,
the political networks are formed by the same initial set of political candidates.
A set of statistics regarding the three periods can be seen in Table 3, Table
1 (tweets sent by users through their complete timelines) and Table 2 (tweets
sent by users through the specific time windows).
Party Candidates (leaders).We utilized the set of o cial political candidates
running for the parliamentary elections in our di↵erent periods of study who
6Table 2: Number of tweets sent by confirmed advocates per period under study.
Period KKE ANTARSIA LAE SYRIZA PASOK POTAMI ND HA ANEL TOTAL
1st .004K 3.3K - 28.54K 11.31K 10.47K 14.23K .95K 14.77K 83.57K
2nd .79K 7.22K 9.82K 30.12K 26.07K 28.09K 32.93K 5.48K 20.8K 161.32K
3rd 3.14K 9.68K 13.78K 31.21K 40.68K 29.26K 59.1K 6.56K 22.45K 215.84K
Table 3: Political Candidates with Twitter Accounts, and Confirmed Advocates
Extracted for Each Party
1st Period 2nd, 3rd Periods
Party Candidates Accounts Percentage
Confirmed
Advocates
Candidates Accounts Percentage
Confirmed
Advocates
1 KKE 413 6 1.45% 41 482 8 1.66% 48
2 ANTARSIA 366 42 11.48% 158 341 39 11.44% 1119
3 LAE - - - - 698 61 8.74% 420
4 SYRIZA 433 180 41.57% 1485 424 136 32.08% 866
5 PASOK 399 108 27.07% 680 406 126 31.03% 842
6 POTAMI 405 113 27.90% 1087 406 103 25.37% 1003
7 ND 425 242 56.94% 1514 423 241 56.97% 1845
8 HA 388 65 16.75% 130 320 56 17.50% 142
9 ANEL 407 92 22.60% 695 404 78 19.31% 560
had a Twitter account. Some statistics related to the political candidates can
be found in Table 3. Note that we manually identified the twitter accounts of
the candidates since such list does not exist. Due to space limitation, we do not
present the names of the candidates and their respective twitter accounts.
Definition of Political Spaces. Here we present the Greek political parties
that we classified in three political spaces (Far Right, Center, Far left). The
abbreviations below are used throughout the paper.
- Far Right: I ANEL (Independent Greeks): Splinter party of ND (New
Democracy), founded in 2012. Populist, conspirationanist, nationalist, anti-bailout,
anti-european, anti-semitic. I HA (Golden Dawn): Marginally existed since
1980s. Extremist, ultra-nationalist, racist, nazi-friendly, violent, welfare chavin-
ism, anti-establishment.
- Far Left: I SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left): Party of the radi-
cal left, since 2004. Ethno-populist, eurosceptic, anti-bailout, conspirationist. I
KKE (Communist Party of Greece): Orthodox Communist Party, since 1920s.
I LAE (Popular Unity): Splinter party of SYRIZA, since September 2015. Anti-
Euroepan, pro-national currency, anti-German, pro-Russian.IANTARSIA (An-
ticapitalist Left Cooperation for the Overthrow): Stalinist, inclined to violent
activism, antifascist, leftist.
- Center: We have grouped as political parties belonging to the center: I
PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement): Party of the centre-left, existing since
1974, pro-European, pro-bailout. I POTAMI (River): Social-liberal party of the
centre, founded in 2014, pro-European, pro-bailout. I NEA DEMOCRATIA
(New Democracy): Centre-right party, founded in 1974, pro-European, pro-bailout.
7Fig. 1: Advocate’s Identification
3.2 Advocate’s Identification
In order to illustrate and analyze the political network we identify users that
advocate one or more of the political spaces defined. To do this, we use the
retweets as an indication of endorsement. Based on this assumption we followed
the steps below:
– Initially, we identify a pool of ‘Potential Advocates’ (PA). These are the
users that have been retweeted by the Political Candidates (PC - see previous
section), at least once.
– If the Potential Advocates have retweeted back the Political Candidates
(Leaders) then we consider them as ‘Confirmed Advocates’ (CAs) (this
means that we are confident that these are members of the same political
space as the one they have been endorsed through the re-tweet).
– In order to find more Confirmed Advocates we follow the same process in an
iterative fashion. After the first iteration, we seek to see if a Potential Advo-
cate has been re-tweeted by a Political Candidate or a Confirmed Advocate.
When we find new Confirmed Advocates we add them in the pool, and so
forth. The process stops when no new Confirmed Advocates are found.
An illustration of these steps can be seen in Figure 1. From our experimental
evaluation we observed that the process stops after two or three iterations. The
reliability of the above algorithm has been assessed by manual investigation and
we confirmed that it accurately extracts advocates of all political spaces.
Collected Data. Data collection was operated with the following algorithm:
1. Identify the Twitter accounts of the political candidates (leaders).
2. Collect messages from their timelines (up to 2000 messages)
3. Collect the twitter followers that leaders have ReTweeted at least once (PAs).
4. Collect the timelines of the PAs (up to 2000 messages).
5. Based on the full timelines of leaders and PAs, scan for ReTweets and apply
the Advocate Identification algorithm (see Figure 1) in order to extract the
list of confirmed advocates.
86. The confirmed advocates are the users that we utilize to illustrate the inter-
actions among the political spaces. We filter out all messages not belonging
to the three periods under study.
In Tables 1, 2 and 3 we present details about the collected data. Interestingly,
there is a significant variation in the number of candidates who owned a twitter
account (ranging from 1-60%) among di↵erent political parties. The number of
advocates per network is changing over time, which means that networks are
dynamic and not static, reflecting the o↵-line political fluidity of the context
under study.
4 Hypotheses Under Investigation
In this paper, we will investigate the following hypotheses:
– H1. In line with findings which show that individuals and groupings which
sit at the extreme ends of the ideological scale are particularly likely to form
echo chambers, we expect to find strong levels of cohesion on the edges of
the political network (echo chambers’ hypothesis).
– H2. Given the level of polarization that emerged over the financial crisis, we
expect to find levels of interaction of radical actors which do not only reflect
traditional ideological proximity, but also coalitions formed around emerging
divides (hypothesis on convergence over new divisions).
– H3. Given the ideological di↵erences regarding the hierarchy between the
extreme edges of the party system, we expect that far right networks will
display higher level of internal cohesion, but lower levels of internal interac-
tion than far left communities. (intra-group hierarchy hypothesis)
– H4. We expect to find intensity of sentiment to be stronger in extremist and
radical networks. (di↵erences in sentiment)
4.1 (H1) Echo Chambers
We introduce the metric of internal cohesion, in order to calculate the level
of interaction in the three periods under study. By internal cohesion we define
the proportion of interaction which targets the members of the same political
network. More specifically, the internal cohesion of party i is defined as follows:
Given a set of political parties P = {p1 [ . . .[ pN} where N is the total number
of parties, and U a set of users belonging to all political parties:
Internal Cohesioni =
Interactions of all users uj 2 pi with users uk 2 pi
Interactions of all users uk 2 P with users uj 2 pi (1)
This metric counts cohesion on a relative scale and can, thus, account for
‘echo chamberness’ by comparing levels of cohesion between political networks.
In order to explore the kinds of interactions, we examined separately the cohe-
sion of communication by replies and retweets. We consider replies to denote
9?
??
??
??
???
???
????????
???
??????
?????
??????
?? ????
??
??
??
??
???
?
?
(a) Replies’ Cohesion
?
??
??
??
???
???
????????
???
??????
?????
??????
?? ????
??
??
??
??
???
?
?
(b) Retweets’ Cohesion
Fig. 2: Evolution of Internal Cohesion - 1st, 2nd, 3rd period for each party
discussions or exchanges of opinions, whereas retweets to manifest agreement or
endorsement of ideas.
As Figure 2 depicts, retweets display higher levels of cohesion than replies,
for all political networks. This finding testifies the di↵erent use that advocates
attribute to those two modes of communication and is in line with our assump-
tion on the matter. Networks at the edges of the party system are more cohesive
than networks at the centre. HA and ANEL on the far right and KKE and
ANTARSIA are the most cohesive political networks in the three periods under
study. The right-wing extremist party (HA) is the one which mostly resembles to
an echo chamber, followed by the orthodox communist (KKE). We can thus ten-
tatively validate our first hypothesis. Nonetheless, interestingly the overall trend
for cohesion is to decrease over time for all parties except from KKE, which
means that political networks are not static; they develop particular dynamics
and in our case study, they tend to lose degrees of ‘echo chamberness’, especially
from the first to the second period, that political intensity and polarization in-
creased. Hence, polarization can reduce cohesion of the most introvert political
networks.
4.2 (H2) Alliances over new divisions
In Figure 3 we observe the retweet networks (i.e. who retweeted whom) in the
three periods under study. Nodes represent the advocates of each space and
the edges are the retweets. Di↵erent colours in the nodes illustrate the di↵erent
political parties. The size of the nodes shows the level of degree (indegree and
outdegree interactions). In other words the size is indicative of how active the
advocate is in terms of retweets. In order to analyze these results, we defined
the measures of density and interactivity of a network (see Equations below).
The first one illustrates how active the users are as a network and the second
calculates the degree in which the main communication is channeled from a small
number of users (active) to their followers (inactive users).
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Fig. 3: Retweets’ Political Network
Table 4: Density & Interactivity of the Political Network of Figure 3
Period Messages Senders Recipients Density Interactivity
1st 24588 732 1957 9.14 0.27
2nd 104922 939 3787 22.20 0.20
3rd 117972 1389 4221 21.03 0.25
density =
number of messages
total number of users
(2)
interactivity =
number of users sending messages
total number of users
(3)
Density of communication increases considerably from the first period to the
second: from 9.14 messages per user to 22.20, whereas it remains almost equally
dense in the third. Interactivity is nonetheless low in the three periods under
study, reaching its lowest point during the second, when 20% of users in the
networks retweet others. Overall, polarization increased density of discussions
but did not foster interactivity between users.
During the first period, we can observe two sub-areas. Sub-area A is more
mixed than B and portrays retweets of advocates of PASOK, POTAMI and ND.
All three are pro-bailout or pro-EU parties. In sub-area B we can observe parties
of the far right and the far left, which are closer than with parties of sub-area
A, but distinct party spaces. In the second and the third period, the network
is denser and the communication polarized. During the second period, we can
distinguish a fragmented network in two distanced clusters. The first cluster
still contains the pro-bailout parties, the connectivity of which is much bigger,
whereas the second cluster pertains the anti-bailout or anti-EU parties (HA,
ANEL, SYRIZA, LAE, KKE, ANTARSIA), which have now merged. As a result,
we can no longer see distinct party spaces. During the third period, the network
is still divided and clustered, the main di↵erence with the second period being
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the position of the right-wing extremist HA, which has moved away from the pro-
bailout camp. This is due to the fact that during the third period, the agenda was
largely dominated by the refugee crisis, which is an issue of division between the
far right and the far left. Overall, the visualization of the network following their
retweets’ traces shows us that there are changes in the structure of the network
depending on the political context. As polarization increased from the first to the
second and the third period, communication became more fragmented, with its
structure moving from party-oriented to issue-oriented. Polarization facilitated
convergence between ideological divergent spaces and reinforced the merging of
the extremes of the party networks.
What we generally observe is that party advocates not only retweet the “usual
suspects” - their ideological neighbours following the Left-Right axis - but also
that they retweet their allies inside the pro-bailout or the anti-bailout camp.
4.3 (H3) Intra-Group Hierarchy
The di↵erent levels of internal cohesion are portrayed in Figure 2. Strong levels
of cohesion have been found on networks belonging to the edges of the party
systems. HA displays the highest internal cohesion among all party networks,
followed by KKE. Even though the far right ANEL also presents relatively higher
cohesion than parties of the far left or the centre, the di↵erences are small.
Hence, higher levels of internal cohesion seem to relate with spaces associated
with totalitarian ideologies. In order to compare how communication is di↵used
inside the edges of the political system online, we divided the network in three
ideological spaces: the far left, the centre and the far right. For each space, we
portray the internal architecture, the structure of the network, as it is formed by
the replies and the retweets of users targeting advocates of the same ideological
space. Figure 5 depicts the visualization of the di↵usion of communications flows
inside each space. At first sight, the shape of the networks on the far right and the
far left is fragmented, whereas connectivity seems homogeneously distributed for
the political centre. On the far right, the right-wing extremist component (HA)
seems hardly connected to the populist, radical one (ANEL), only via a few users-
bridges. Fragmentation appears also on the far left, even though its di↵erent
components do not figure so distanced as on the far right. In the centre, we can
discern certain parts of the networks being more populated by distinct colours,
which manifests conversations at the party-level, developed around prominent
figures. Nonetheless, the political centre portrays a better connected and densely
populated online network. Hence, ideology seems to correlate with the internal
communication structure of neighbouring political networks.
By calculating the density and interactivity for each ideological space, we
can compare the nature of communication inside each ideological space. Table 5
depicts the evolution of the two measures over time. Communication is denser
among the far right in the first period and among the center in the second and
the third. The intensity of discussions is dropping for the far left in the third
period, most probably due to the capitulation of the government over the bailout
agreement and the splinter inside the family of the far left. Overall polarization
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(a) Far Left (b) Center (c) Far Right
Fig. 4: Interaction Among Political Spaces’ Groups during the 2nd Period
Table 5: Density & Interactivity for the Politically Extreme Groups
Period Political Group Messages Senders Recipients Density Interactivity
Far Left 6269 600 473 5.84 0.56
1st Center 8329 352 994 6.19 0.26
Far Right 4121 99 232 12.45 0.30
Far Left 23514 316 1309 14.47 0.19
2nd Center 52045 519 2121 19.71 0.20
Far Right 7150 145 316 15.51 0.31
Far Left 24173 411 1326 13.92 0.24
3rd Center 66694 805 2456 20.45 0.25
Far Right 6737 194 364 12.07 0.35
increased density of communications inside the three political spaces. Interactiv-
ity in the far left is the highest during the first period among the three political
spaces, despite its low levels of density. The trend is reversed in the next two
periods: the far right displays the highest levels of interactivity among the three
political spaces. Our hypothesis is thus rejected. This means that polarization
increased interactivity of the far right spectrum and communication is not hier-
archical as we would expect, following the organizational norms of the far right
party family.
4.4 (H4) Di↵erences between far right and far left sentiment
To investigate this hypothesis we conducted sentiment analysis on the within net-
work discussions. More specifically, we applied our opinion mining algorithms [1]
to the messages sent (as replies) between users of the same political space. Our
tool, DidaxTo [1], is able to extract the opinion words (terms like ‘beautiful’ or
‘convenient’) for any domain in an unsupervised fasinon. Opinion words can be
positive or negative. Examples of opinion words discovered by DidaxTo for the
given set of tweets are: ‘charismatic’, ‘responsibility’, ‘solidarity’ and ‘unsustain-
ability’, ‘overthrow’, ‘unconstitutional’.
Based on these, we calculated the sentiment of an individual tweet by sub-
tracting the number of negative words from the number of positive words. If, for
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example, a tweet contains more positive words it is considered positive. Then we
calculated the sentiment of each day by subtracting the negative tweets at that
day from the positive ones. In Figures 5a, 5b and 5c we expose the sentiment
plots for each period and political space. The ‘y’ axes expresses the number of
tweets per day and the color represents negative/positive sentiment; the size of
the dot represents the absolute value of the sentiment. In the first period we
recorded more ‘extreme’ days in terms of sentiment comparing to the other two
periods since sentiment reaches values like +30 or +40. In the second period we
see that there is high activity during July in all political spaces, which was the
most polarized period, due to the referendum and the enduring negotiations of
the government with the EU. The most negative sentiment is expressed during
that period. Overall, the sentiment is positive most of the time in all periods
and spaces. However, the volume of negative sentiment is higher in the far left
and the far right. This finding validates our hypothesis and is associated to the
radical nature of those ideological spaces and the way this is reflected in their
discourse.
5 Conclusions
Times of crises are also times of political reshu✏ing and realignment. In this
study, we have shown that in periods of crises, online political networks are
porous. Contrary to previous findings which considered political discussions tak-
ing place only inside echo chambers, we showed that political networks are
not static neither solid, as political actors consider turbulence and volatility as
structures of political opportunity in order to gain visibility, leverage and issue-
ownership. This finding is particularly interesting for the radical and extremist
actors: even through we have shown that their introvertness is higher compared
to moderate networks, they tend to lose levels of cohesion when polarization
increases. By focusing on the great Greek crisis at periods of di↵erent political
intensity, we showed how emerging divisions related to the crisis a↵ected the
structure of the networks and facilitated convergence between the edges of polit-
ical networks. Political networks evolved from party-oriented to issue-oriented.
We showed that when electoral competition is not driven by the left-right divide,
the online world absorbs the new cleavage. When delving into the structure of
the network and the sentiment within the far right and the far left, no significant
di↵erences were found. Further research needs to be done in order to explore the
impact of the agenda on the structure of political networks.
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